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Introduction
In recent years, in the social sciences, interest has grown in 
both realism and complexity approaches. With few excep-
tions, notably in the work of David Byrne and Emma Uprichard 
(Byrne, 1998; Byrne and Uprichard, 2012), these two 
approaches have not converged, either philosophically or 
methodologically. In this article, we make a modest attempt, 
through an empirical example, to show how complexity and 
realism do converge, but also how that convergence can be 
harnessed to produce novel and useful understandings of 
micro- and meso-level social change.
This article will proceed as follows: we will begin by restat-
ing the case for a realist approach to social research and intro-
duce some suggested modifications to what has become the 
dominant view of realism in social science – that of ‘critical 
realism’. In two further brief sections, we outline some features 
of probability theory and complexity that might be incorporated 
into a complex-realist approach to social investigation. 
Following this, we provide an empirical example of how social 
continuity and change can be demonstrated using a complex-
realist approach to researching the trajectories of prisoners at 
risk of self-harm.
Realism, complexity and probability
Realism
Through the 20th century, realism has offered an alternative 
paradigm in scientific thinking to that of idealism and 
positivism, and their variants (Harré, 1986). It differs from 
these (which would include phenomenology, logical positiv-
ism, instrumentalism, etc.) by equally privileging the issue of 
what exists, alongside our warrant to know what exists. That 
is, it reinstates ontology, which has been denied or postponed 
in rival philosophies of science. To its critics, this is a leap of 
faith for it requires the theorisation of non-observables and 
their treatment as entities, or potentially so. In much of the 
earlier discussions of realism (see, for example, Potter, 
1996), entities were seen as simplified physical things or 
forces, capable of measurement. Relativist critics of realism, 
in social science, referred to this as the ‘death and furniture’ 
argument, suggesting that social processes were dynamic, 
complex and, most of all, socially constructed and inevitably 
interpreted (Potter, 1996). In the natural sciences, this was 
already a bit of a straw person; where realist interpretations 
of wave–particle duality, in quantum physics, posited an 
interaction between observer and the collapse of the wave 
function. In other words, the issues raised by unobservables 
in the physical world were meat and drink to realist philoso-
phers of natural science. It has been a long while since the 
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physicist, in the laboratory, was able to rely on his or her own 
senses for empirical confirmation or falsification!
However, Potter and other relativists do have a point 
about the social world, in that not only is it endlessly dynamic 
but its existence and its development depend on human inter-
action and, at root, individual action born of interpretation. 
As Norman Denzin (1983) claimed, there is an ‘inherent 
indeterminateness in the lifeworld’ (p. 133). This is a seduc-
tive claim and one often deployed against realism. But, on 
the other hand, a moment’s reflection shows this to be a 
claim too far. To begin with, supporters of social indetermin-
ism must explain how it is that social order exists and is 
maintained and, perhaps paradoxically, how sometimes it 
breaks down or changes quite dramatically. Added to this, if 
the world was so indetermined and simply a product of con-
sciousness (as Denzin goes on to claim), then the constraints 
that prevent us from doing just as we wish (laws, rules, sanc-
tions and physical constraints created by humans) should be 
routinely capable of transcendence, but they are not.
Social science variants of realism do, however, seem to go 
the other way,1 with what might be described as a ‘strong’ 
version of causality that depends on natural necessity. Critical 
realism, the dominant variety in social science, relies on the 
idea of ‘causal powers’ (elsewhere often referred to as ‘dis-
positions’; Mumford, 2007). These can be either passive or 
active, depending on context. Take the example of ‘labour 
power’, used by Andrew Sayer (1992) – in his words,
The nature or constitution of an object and its causal powers are 
internally or necessarily related: a plane can fly by virtue of its 
aerodynamic form, engines etc; gunpowder can explode by 
virtue of its unstable chemical structure; multinational firms can 
sell their products dear and buy their labour cheap by virtue of 
operating in several countries with different levels of 
development … (p. 105)
However, gunpowder and multinational firms have quite 
different kinds of dispositional properties. The unstable 
chemical structure of gunpowder can be explained by a rela-
tively small number of environmental contingencies, them-
selves grounded in physical laws, whereas multinational 
firms are time-specific evolving and their dispositions 
explained only in relation to other evolving structures, them-
selves having a dispositional character.
In order to work, people must sell their labour, or make a 
product that they can sell, and there has to be a demand for 
their labour, or product. A person may possess labour power, 
but the circumstances under which this may be activated or 
sustained can vary enormously. At no point can we specify a 
set of conditions necessary to the exercise of labour power, 
though of course we might specify sufficient conditions. 
Powers must be realised under particular circumstances, but 
their necessity is ever elusive.
Critical realism and its variants face both an ontological 
paradox and an epistemological one. The ontological one is 
that the strong version of causality they propose is (at least 
apparently) deterministic, yet the causal powers responsible 
are indeterministic. The ‘real’ world is ontologically indeter-
ministic, yet structured. It is complex.
Complexity
Some systems in the world are deterministic and most of 
these are more closely bound by fundamental physical laws, 
such as gravity and thermodynamics. They will never be 
entirely deterministic because local variations of (say) air 
pressure or material construction will intervene. Some phe-
nomena are wholly stochastic, for example, particles sus-
pended in a fluid (described as Brownian motion), some are 
apparently stochastic, but through time some patterning can 
be discerned, and others, though exhibiting some degree of 
randomness, nevertheless exhibit order and form over time. 
Indeed, all phenomena that might be described probabilisti-
cally exhibit some degree of stochastic behaviour. Karl 
Popper (1979) provided us with a useful analogy (p. 296), 
when he contrasted the behaviour of clouds with that of 
clocks. The former have measurable properties, but these can 
only be approximately known and measured through time, 
whereas clocks (and he meant old-fashioned clockwork 
clocks) have relatively precise mechanisms that behave in a 
reliable and predictable way. Some systems, he goes on to 
say, are more like clouds and some more like clocks.
This is a good analogy for the social world, in which its 
components are mostly more cloud than clock like, yet some 
parts of it will veer towards ‘clockness’, while others hardly 
achieve the recognisable form of clouds.
Clocks are complicated systems, so are mobile phones, 
motorbikes and space shuttles, but they are not complex – their 
behaviour and properties are not subject to influence of ran-
dom variables (at least when they are working properly) 
(Cilliers, 1998). Clouds are, and so are most phenomena in the 
social world. This distinction is at the heart of the development 
of ‘chaos theory’, and complexity, in the last 50 years. The dis-
covery of ‘chaos’ was in the behaviour of weather systems. 
Well into the 20th century, meteorologists subscribed to the 
view that if we knew enough about initial conditions, we 
would be able to predict and even control the weather. But in 
the 1960s, scientists modelling weather found that very slight 
changes in initial conditions could bring about huge changes 
in weather patterns later (Gleick, 1987: 14–15). The discovery 
of chaos heralded a whole new way of thinking about the natu-
ral (and later social) world. Researchers noted how relatively 
stable systems in weather, oceans and biological systems 
could change suddenly, or descend into apparent disorder, and 
conversely, how apparently stochastic systems could become 
ordered. Complex systems, exhibiting such characteristics, 
exist throughout nature in the development of galaxies to cell 
division (Kauffman, 1995). There is much to say about chaos 
and complexity, but for our purposes, it is enough to make a 
few observations about the social world that suggest that it and 
its components are a quintessentially complex system.
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The first thing to note is that despite what the social con-
structionists would say, it is possible to explain and predict 
the social world, partly because it is rule based and partly 
because agents in it act inductively on past experience, which 
mostly exhibits a large degree of predictability. In other 
words, in our everyday lives, we are aware of and (mostly) 
obey social rules, and those people with whom we interact 
also do this and exhibit relatively predictable behaviour. This 
permits good enough lay explanations and predictions. It is 
mostly not stochastic. Social scientists, who wish to produce 
explanations and predictions with a greater precision, see a 
world that exhibits both continuity and change, but is also 
characterised by similarity and difference across social strata 
and time. It is fashionable to say that social scientists study 
social change, but in order to do this, they must also explain 
social stability. Stability is not stasis and will be disturbed 
eventually to one extent or another. As Harvey and Reed 
(cited in Byrne, 1998: 23) put it, in the absence of significant 
perturbations, systems will follow a normal trajectory, but if 
disrupted, random fluctuations may arise. Our clock analogy 
has one further use: a mechanical clock, with a pendulum, is 
a relatively precise and predictable instrument, but if you 
disturb the pendulum, it will fluctuate randomly and, depend-
ing how much you disturbed it, that degree of randomness 
persists for a greater or lesser period, until it returns to equi-
librium. Whack it hard enough and the ‘randomness’ may 
preclude a return to equilibrium, because you have broken it!
Complexity theorists employ a vocabulary of ‘Strange 
Attractors’ and ‘Phase Space’ to describe this. Strange 
Attractors, in complexity theory, refers to time-ordered pat-
terns towards which other trajectories converge. Strange 
Attractors can be understood to exist within ‘Phase Space’, 
the space of the possible where anything can happen but not 
everything will happen given the structured, rule-driven 
nature of the social:
The geometry of dynamical systems takes place in a mental 
space, known as phase space. It’s very different from ordinary 
physical space. Phase space contains not just what happens but 
what might happen under different circumstances. It’s the space 
of the possible. (Cohen and Stewart, 1994: 200)
The social world can therefore be thought of as overlap-
ping, or multi-dimensional, ‘phase spaces’, with different 
probabilities and trajectories of change.
For example, some social institutions, or practices, may 
exist for centuries, changing only slightly, because they have 
not been ‘disturbed’. Others exist so briefly they are hardly 
named or recognised because they are greatly disturbed. 
Compare, for example, the institutions of a country in flux, 
such as Somalia, with the stability of Switzerland.
These kinds of comparisons are popular with those who 
write about social complexity (and rightly so), but this works 
better for historians or political scientists than it does for 
social researchers attempting to describe and explain social 
life at the micro- or meso-level. In particular, how do the 
specific changes and interactions at individual level create, 
maintain, change or destroy specific local systems? We use 
the term ‘systems’ as a portmanteau term to describe ways of 
doing things, mores, customs, rules – the reality of social life 
as experienced and acted upon by agents. Although the 
explanation of continuity is crucial (why does the social tra-
jectory of an institution or practice remain undisturbed?), to 
do this, we need to know what is going on at the point of 
change and how that point of change is (seemingly) related 
to further change. Unlike Hume, who said that the striking of 
one billiard ball against another is no warrant to claim the 
cause of the second moving was the striking of the first, as 
realists, we want to theorise a system (or mechanism) that 
will provide an explanation. Thus, measurement, in complex 
systems, is an important aspect of realist ‘closure’.
Probability
We noted that stochastic systems are described by probabil-
ity. Objective probability (as opposed to subjective, or 
Bayesian probability) takes both an epistemological and an 
ontological form. The first is familiar to us, through the sam-
ple survey, and is known as the frequency theory of probabil-
ity. A probabilistic sample of a given population can 
statistically describe that population, within certain known 
and calculable tolerances. Those tolerances are described in 
the error terms of a sample and are subject to the law of large 
numbers. Roughly speaking, the larger the sample, the 
smaller the error term. That is, the bigger the sample, the bet-
ter it will resemble the population. However, a sample can 
tell us nothing about the individual units (often people) 
because they are an ‘ideal’ unit, that is, we do not have data 
on all members of a population and we could substitute one 
random sample for another, within which those in the second 
may or may not have been in the first.
There is another version of objective probability that is 
ontological in character and better mirrors what is meant by 
‘probability’ in relation to complex systems (Gillies, 2000: 
113–168; Williams and Dyer, 2009).2 While our knowledge 
of complex systems may be probabilistic (in the first, episte-
mological, sense), it is the very character of the systems and 
components of systems that are themselves probabilistic in 
character. To fully grasp this, we need to consider what we 
mean by probability, in relation to certainty. The probability 
of an event always lies on a continuum between 0 and 1. Zero 
is the impossibility of an event and one is its necessity. All 
probabilities eventually resolve themselves into zeros or 
ones. So, for example, an accused person will have a proba-
bility of conviction, which may change as a trial progresses, 
but eventually will evolve into a ‘One’ when the judge pre-
sents his or her verdict. That One may be ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’. To continue the hypothetical story, the One of ‘guilty’ 
or ’not guilty’ will then set the probability of future events, 
such as going to prison, re-offending (if guilty), personal 
stigma and so on. Also, the verdict is not neutral in respect of 
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the other agents involved, such as family members, police 
officers, co-accused, victims and so on. Each of their life tra-
jectories will be ‘perturbed’ and the probabilities of future 
events initially set, or changed. In other words, the probabili-
ties are ‘nested’ and changed at each bifurcation (such as the 
judgement of guilty or ‘not guilty’).
The story so far
Before introducing the empirical example, let us summarise 
the theoretical and methodological case we are making. 
The reality of the social world is that it is indeterminate. As 
one of us has argued elsewhere (Williams, 2011), there are 
no necessary conditions in the social world, but rather there 
are different levels of sufficiency, enough to produce out-
comes. In the physical world, such grounding exists in fun-
damental laws such as gravity or thermodynamics 
(Mumford, 2007: 74). However, in the social world, most 
outcomes exist within relatively stable rule-bound social 
structures, but change comes about as a result of perturba-
tions – the greater the perturbation, the greater the change. 
It follows that probability is not just an epistemological 
matter of describing or predicting change, the social world 
itself is probabilistic, with some things very much more 
probable than others. Within ‘phase space’, all outcomes 
are possible, but some are very much more probable than 
others. Yet it is often the ‘improbable’ outcome that brings 
about greater change. The challenge is to develop a method 
that can follow these changes, or map these trajectories, in 
actual systems over time.
Example – mapping the trajectories of 
prisoner repeat self-harm
Background
The data presented in this example were originally collected as 
part of a National Institute of Health Research (NIHR)-funded 
research project one of us was involved with which aimed to 
identify a set of characteristics to assess future risk of self-
harm in adult male and female prisoners (Horton et al., 2014). 
Prisoners are at increased risk of self-harm (Fazel et al., 2011; 
Hawton et al., 2014; Ministry of Justice, 2015). However, not 
all prisoners experience the same level of risk; in particular, 
there are a small number of prisoners who are responsible for 
a large number of self-harm events. Much of the research and 
theories in the area of self-harm broadly derive from the ‘Cry 
of Pain’ model (Williams, 1997) which suggests self-harm is a 
behavioural response to a stressful situation with three compo-
nents which interact to increase risk, namely, (1) the presence 
of defeat, (2) no escape or entrapment, and (3) no rescue. At a 
general level, prisoners share similar sociodemographic char-
acteristics and all experience the ‘pains of imprisonment’ 
(Sykes, 2007 [1958]). Why then are only some rather than all 
prisoners at ‘ultra-high risk’ of repeated self-harm?
As we noted above, the social world is neither simply 
determinate nor chaotically indeterminate or stochastic. 
Cases (in this case prisoners) will experience periods of rela-
tive stability and periods of change where, dependent upon 
perturbations or ‘disturbances’ in their current conditions, 
their lives will bifurcate along different pathways (in this 
case to repeat self-harm or not). Prisoners are not one single, 
homogeneous group but instead consist of different groups 
or types of people, some of whom share common patterns of 
experiences and individual characteristics. Rather than one 
‘cry of pain’ model, how different groups of prisoners cope 
with perturbations caused by the ‘pains of life’, including 
imprisonment, will be different, but within groups, their 
shared experiences give rise to the same or similar outcomes. 
In other words, while we can identify the immediate pertur-
bations that cause the self-harm, as in a Markov chain, these 
initially appear to be independent of patterns of prior events. 
The aim of this research was to identify different groups or 
types of prisoner where membership (described by shared 
patterns of experiences and personal characteristics) meant 
they were at increased or decreased probability of repeated 
self-harm in prison.
Methodology and method
This search for prisoner groups or typologies that are more or 
less likely to repeatedly self-harm is akin to the search for 
‘Strange Attractors’ described earlier in this article. Such 
‘prisoner self-harm attractors’ (in a metaphorical sense) 
emerge over time as shared individual characteristics such as 
resilience and coping (the hidden mechanism in Realism), 
which develop iteratively as a consequence of common 
experiences (the contexts in Realism), mean that pathways or 
personal trajectories converge. Strange Attractors describe a 
series of bifurcations in systems, for example, in turbulence 
flow, which produces patterns, shapes or likenesses. In this 
case, it is people who are more like one another than they are 
like people in other attractors. These underlying patterns or 
‘prisoner self-harm attractors’ exist within Phase Space – the 
macro-level conception of context within which are micro 
multiple overlapping contexts or ‘state spaces’. These con-
texts include prisoners’ previous experiences which impact 
on the development of individual characteristics, including 
individual vulnerabilities, resilience and coping, and how 
they interact with the current prison environment (Griller, 
2014; Liebling, 2005; Slade et al., 2014), as described in 
Figure 1 (a conceptual model or abstraction of the complex-
realist ‘space’ within which prisoner self-harm pathways can 
be understood).
This framework informed the development of the research 
study:
•• From data collection: where a multi-stage prospective 
cohort study recorded data (including personal experi-
ences, thoughts, feelings and actions) describing the 
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‘history’ and ‘current’ micro-contexts or state spaces 
for male and female prisoners aged 18 and above who 
were on an Assessment, Care in Custody, and 
Teamwork (ACCT – a Prison Service Instruction 
2012, which describes the process involved in super-
vising the management of prisoners at risk of harm to 
self, to others and from others) (Ministry of Justice 
and National Offender Management Service, 2012), 
and a 6-month follow-up determined self-harm occur-
rence since baseline;
•• To data analysis: where logistic regression analysis 
revealed gender-specific characteristics that were sta-
tistically significant in identifying prisoners who were 
involved with repeat self-harm, and which mapped 
directly onto a number of gender-specific prisoner 
self-harm typologies or attractors, uncovered using a 
time-ordered cluster analysis method developed by 
one of us (Dyer, 2006, 2011).
Results
The results described four male and four female prisoner self-
harm attractors defined by a number of bifurcation points 
(including history, current and future), where key experiences 
and personal characteristics – such as a history of self-harm 
outside of prison and/or within prison, a history of contact 
with a psychiatrist, current feelings of self-blame and inability 
to concentrate – are responsible for perturbations in the trajec-
tory which led prisoners down one pathway which included 
repeat self-harm or another other with no repeat self-harm.
The first male trajectory (see Figure 2) describes the shared 
experience and characteristics of those prisoners all of whom 
repeated self-harm during the 6-month follow-up. This is a key 
Attractor which gives clues to the increased probability of 
repeat self-harm in this high-risk prisoner population when 
compared with the other Attractors, which map the trajectories 
of those who do not repeat self-harm during the follow-up. The 
key differences or points of perturbation between the two most 
similar male prisoner Attractors 1 (where everyone went on to 
repeat self-harm) and 4 (where no one went on to repeat self-
harm) are the presence or absence of a previous experience of 
prison ACCT monitoring, and the presence or absence of a 
number of key experiences and personal characteristics labelled 
as ‘risk and protective factors’ in the original study.
Findings from the study of male prisoners at ultra-high risk 
of repeat self-harm suggest the probability of a negative out-
come is greatly reduced for those in Attractors 2 and 3 who 
have no previous experience of self-harm or ACCT monitor-
ing in prison and who report more positive thoughts, feelings, 
actions and experiences, and fewer negative ones. A number 
of factors identified as greatly increasing the probability of a 
negative outcome are shared by both Attractors 1 and 4 includ-
ing a history of previous self-harm, contact with a Psychiatrist 
and current feelings of self-blame and inability to concentrate. 
However, those in Attractor 4 are much less likely to repeat 
self-harm because they also report a number of features in 
addition to no previous experience of prison ACCT monitor-
ing which ‘protect’ them from this negative outcome including 
having obtained academic or vocational qualifications and 
current access to support from prison healthcare.
Figure 1. A conceptual model of the Phase Space of prisoner self-harm attractors.
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Interpreting the female attractors is a more difficult under-
taking, not least because the risk and protective factors iden-
tified by the original logistic regression do not map as clearly 
onto the female attractors, again uncovered using a time-
ordered cluster method, as they did for the male attractors. 
The first female trajectory (see Figure 3) describes the shared 
experience and characteristics of those who repeated self-
harm during the 6-month follow-up. The key points of per-
turbation between the two most similar female prisoner 
Attractors 1 (where everyone went on to repeat self-harm) 
and 4 (where no one went on to repeat self-harm) which 
increase the probability of repeat self-harm include
•• A consistent history of previous contact with a psy-
chiatrist and current mental health symptoms such as 
auditory hallucinations,
•• A history of scratching as a specific form of self-harm 
and current episodes of binge eating,
•• The experience of previous prison ACCT monitoring,
•• A significant current prison sentence such as life 
imprisonment or an indeterminate sentence,
•• Reports of negative personal actions such as recent 
episodes of binge eating, physical assault on others 
and various forms of self-harm especially scratching 
but also including cutting, head banging, burning, pre-
venting wounds from healing and making medical 
situations worse.
There is one risk factor shared by Attractors 1 and 4 which 
increases the probability of repeat self-harm and this involves 
the receipt of any form of outside communication, that is, fam-
ily visits, phone calls and letters. Attractor 4 also experiences 
much more consistent negative ‘symptoms’ compared with 
attractor 1, but which includes negative thoughts and feelings 
(including ‘over the last week talking to people has felt too 
much for me’, ‘anxiety has prevented me doing important 
things’, ‘I have felt panic’, ‘made plans to end my life’, and 
‘felt overwhelmed by my problems’) rather than actions (as in 
attractor 1, including ‘during the last week I had episodes of 
binge eating’, ‘over the last week I have been physically violent 
to others’ and ‘I have scratched myself on purpose’), and which 
common sense might argue should put them at greatly increased 
probability of a negative outcome. However, female prisoners 
in Attractor 4 did not go on to repeat self-harm during follow-
up, which suggests that the key features which ‘protect’ them 
from this negative outcome include no previous experience of 
prison ACCT monitoring and that reporting negative thoughts 
and feelings is not the same as actually acting on them.
Figure 2. Adult male prisoner self-harm trajectories (pathways between clusters).
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This empirical example demonstrates how the application of 
a complex-realist framework and associated methodology and 
techniques can uncover patterns of similarity and difference at 
the level of individual cases which, rather than suggesting the 
social world is either deterministic or stochastic, demonstrates 
that common or shared contextual experiences and the hidden 
mechanism of personal characteristics lead to common or 
shared outcomes. This being the case, rather than applying the 
‘cry of pain’ model at a macro- or generalised level, we could 
use data for individual prisoners with similar experiences to cal-
culate the likely probability of future repeat self-harm events.
The methodological possibility of 
complex realism
The above examples demonstrate how within a relatively 
‘contained’ phase space, change occurs and patterns are 
established. There is an absence of necessity in these trajec-
tories because they can be changed as a result of relatively 
minor perturbations (e.g. a history of previous ACCT moni-
toring). Yet what we witness is the reality of a complex 
causal system operating through time. Although, here, the 
probabilities themselves have not been measured, the clus-
tering itself demonstrates that some events are very much 
more likely to happen than others. The history of ACCT 
monitoring in individuals, played out through bifurcations in 
respect of variables through time, demonstrates patterns, 
which are not necessary (in the realist sense), but those pat-
terns do coalesce into ‘Strange Attractors’ (in a metaphorical 
sense), which in turn are predictors of continuing stability. 
The reality of this world described is neither deterministic 
nor indeterministic, but complex.
For a long while, the methodologies of realism and com-
plexity have promised much, but in both cases, empirical 
closure has been elusive. In the first case, this has been hin-
dered by the insistence on a principle of natural necessity 
and then the difficulty in demonstrating this satisfactorily 
through method. In the second case, a convincing broad 
brush approach to macro-level phenomena can demonstrate 
complexity at work in its outcomes, but not its process. The 
example above is an attempt to show complex social change 
at work at a meso-level. Unlike analyses based on sample 
Figure 3. Adult female prisoner self-harm trajectories (pathways between clusters).
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data, which must produce probability estimates based on the 
ideal units of a sample, this method follows the trajectory of 
cases through time and maps the interactions with key 
events and features in the social world. It demonstrates the 
bifurcating points of change and how these contribute to 
future patterns and change. By taking slices through time, 
we are sampling an actual reality. In this sense, the method 
is truly realist.
Above, we asked the question of whether there could be a 
complex realism that is based upon an ontology of probability. 
This seems to be demonstrated in the above example, and indeed, 
this, we believe, can give us warrant to be realist about entities 
because we are able to demonstrate the process of change and 
stability through the trajectories of individuals as cases.
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Notes
1. See the debate between Williams and Norrie (2011) in Social 
Epistemology for a fuller critique of Critical Realism by 
Williams and the response by Norrie.
2. The propensity theory of probability.
References
Byrne D (1998) Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An 
Introduction. London: Routledge.
Byrne D and Uprichard E (2012) Useful complex causality. In: 
Kinkard H (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social 
Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–129.
Cilliers P (1998) Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding 
Complex Systems. London: Routledge.
Cohen J and Stewart I (1994) The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering 
Simplicity in a Complex World. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books.
Denzin N (1983) Interpretive interactionism. In: Morgan G (ed.) 
Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research. Beverly Hills, 
CA: SAGE, pp. 129–146.
Dyer W (2006) The psychiatric and criminal careers of mentally 
disordered offenders referred to a custody diversion team 
in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Forensic 
Mental Health 5(1): 15–28.
Dyer W (2011) Mapping pathways. In: Williams M and Vogt WP 
(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Innovation in Social Research 
Methods. London: SAGE.
Fazel S, Grann M, Kling B, et al. (2011) Prison suicide in 12 countries: 
An ecological study of 861 suicides during 2003–2007. Social 
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 46(3): 191–195.
Gillies D (2000) Philosophical Theories of Probability. London: 
Routledge.
Gleick J (1987) Chaos: Making a New Science. Harmondsworth: 
Viking Penguin.
Griller J (2014) The Paradox of Self-Harm in Prison: Psychopathy 
or an Evolved Coping Strategy? Hamburg: Anchor Academic 
Publishing.
Harré R (1986) Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural 
Sciences. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hawton K, Linsell L, Adeniji T, et al. (2014) Self-harm in prisons 
in England and Wales: An epidemiological study of preva-
lence, risk factors, clustering, and subsequent suicide. The 
Lancet 383(9923): 1147–1154.
Horton M, Wright N, Dyer W, et al. (2014) Assessing the risk of 
self-harm in an adult offender population: An incidence cohort 
study. Health Technology Assessment 18: 1–151.
Kauffman S (1995) At Home in the Universe: The Search for the 
Laws of Complexity. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Liebling A (2005) The Effects of Imprisonment. Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing.
Ministry of Justice (2015) Safety in custody statistics England and 
Wales deaths in prison custody to December 2014 assaults 
and self-harm to September 2014. Ministry of Justice Statistics 
Bulletin, 29 January, Crown copyright. Produced by the Ministry 
of Justice.
Ministry of Justice and National Offender Management Service (2012) 
Management of prisoners at risk of harm to self, to others and from 
other (Safer Custody). PSI 64/2011, 1 April,  NOMS Agency Board.
Mumford S (2007) Filled in space. In: Kistler M and Gnassounou 
B (eds) Dispositions and Causal Powers. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
pp. 7–80.
Norrie S (2011) Reality and probability’: Contra Williams. Social 
Epistemology 25(1): 57–66.
Popper K (1979) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Potter J (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and 
Social Construction. London: SAGE.
Sayer A (1992) Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (2nd 
edn). London: Routledge.
Slade K, Edelmann R, Worrall M, et al. (2014) Applying the cry of 
pain model as a predictor of deliberate self-harm in an early-
stage adult male prison population. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology 19(1): 131–146.
Sykes G (2007 [1958]) Society of Captives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Williams J (1997) Cry of Pain. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Williams M (2011) Contingent realism – abandoning necessity. 
Social Epistemology 25(1): 37–56.
Williams M and Dyer W (2009) Single case probabilities. In: Ragin 
C and Byrne D (eds) Case Based Methods. London: SAGE, 
pp. 84–100.
Author biographies
Malcolm Williams is a professor and Co-Director of the Cardiff 
University Q-Step Centre. He has published widely in methods and 
methodology.  His latest book is Key Concepts in the Philosophy of 
Social Research (SAGE 2016).
Wendy Dyer is a senior lecturer in Criminology at Northumbria 
University. She has published in offender mental health and 
research methodology. Her latest publication is Enhanced Support 
for High Intensity Users of the Criminal Justice System (Social 
Policy and Society, Vol.15(1), pp. 43–44).
